Mrs Sinead Prince1
1Queensland University of Technology
In order to determine whether genetic enhancement is morally permissible, it is first necessary to understand what is meant by the concept ‘enhancement’. While most people accept a legitimate role for genetic therapy, enhancement, such as genetically improving a person’s cognitive function, is much more controversial. Those who argue for differential moral treatment of the two usually distinguish the concepts because therapy treats disease, whereas enhancement improves already healthy functions. This distinction could be blurred; we provide medical treatments, such as abortion, vaccinations, and sterilisation procedures, which intervene in healthy bodies but do not necessarily enhance them. This undermines the distinction between therapy and enhancement, and from this, genetic enhancement is arguably morally permissible to the same extent that genetic therapy is. I argue that this moral conclusion is mistaken. To make this argument, I apply Wittgenstein’s ‘open texture’ approach to, what I believe is, the central concept of ‘healthcare’. While all therapies are part of healthcare, as the examples show, not all healthcare is therapeutic. I argue that while we may admit some biomedical technologies as part of healthcare, this does not mean we automatically must accept all such technologies. The concept of healthcare may be imperfect, but we may still meaningfully distinguish genetic enhancement from genetic therapy from a moral perspective. We must assess genetic enhancement on its own merits.
Biography:
Sinead is a PhD Candidate and Research Assistant. Sinead’s PhD explores whether genetic enhancement is ethically permissible using theories of well-being. Sinead graduated from Queensland University of Technology with a Bachelor of Law (First Class Honours)/ Bachelor of Biomedical Science (Distinction) and was awarded the Australia Centre for Health Law Research Scholarship to support her PhD.