Re-opening a 40-year-old can of worms: Synthetic embryos and the moral status of early human life
Julian Koplin1, Monash University 1Monash University Vic, Australia
Abstract
In June 2023, a team of stem cell scientists led by Magdalena Żernicka-Goetz announced the creation of ‘synthetic human embryos.’ The entities closely resembled human embryos. However, since they were created using human (embryonic) stem cells rather than a fertilised egg, they evaded UK regulation of human embryo research. Indeed, they were apparently allowed to develop slightly beyond the 14-day limit that the UK imposes on in vitro embryonic development.
This breakthrough means that we urgently need to resolve a live question in stem cell ethics: how should research with stem cell-based models of human embryos be regulated? Much existing discussion of this topic centres on whether synthetic embryos meet various definitions of a ‘human embryo.’ I argue that a better approach would be to revisit the underlying moral rationale for restricting embryo research, and then determine whether this rationale also applies to synthetic embryos. This is, however, easier said than done. The key text underpinning current regulations (the 1984 Warnock Report) sought a political compromise between different views on the moral status of human embryos; it did not articulate a robust philosophical justification for its recommendations. This leaves us without a well-established rationale for embryo research restrictions, and without meaningful moral guidance for synthetic embryos.
The upshot is that, unfortunately, we need to re-open a question that the field of bioethics had hoped to move on from: on what does the moral status of human embryos depend? I conclude by making some suggestions for how this discussion should proceed.
Biography
Julian Koplin is a lecturer at the Monash Bioethics Centre. His research interests include stem cell ethics, human tissue and organ donation, and AI ethics.