Bioethics and the Concept of Disability

Bioethics and the Concept of Disability

Joel Michael Reynolds1, Georgetown University Washington

1Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

Abstract

Testimony by disabled people concerning the relationship between their experiences and overall well-being has long been an object of study for social scientists. Often discussed in terms of “the disability paradox,” these studies contrast the intuitive horribleness of certain impaired states against the testimonial evidence suggesting that people in such states do not in fact experience their lives as horrible. In this paper, I discuss whether and how the concept of disability itself may contribute to this “paradox” and why this presents serious issues for research in bioethics, medical practice, and health law. I focus especially on the three related problems–overgeneralization, hypocognition, and dehumanization–and I argue that for bioethics to promote both equity and quality of care for disabled people, a far more nuanced and complex conceptual architecture of disability is needed.

Biography

Joel Michael Reynolds is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Disability Studies at Georgetown University, Senior Research Scholar in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Senior Bioethics Advisor to and Fellow of The Hastings Center, and Faculty Scholar of The Greenwall Foundation.

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