Mr Marcus Teo1
1Centre For Biomedical Ethics, National University Of Singapore, Singapore
Biography:
Marcus holds a BA (Hons) in Philosophy with Highest Distinction from Nanyang Technological University (NTU), where he focused on applied ethics and moral psychology. Prior to this, he completed his Diploma in Psychology Studies in Temasek Polytechnic.
His interdisciplinary training has led him to clinch the Highly Commended Award in the Psychology category in the 2019 Global Undergraduate Awards for his work in reconciling Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Rationalism. He is also a recipient of the 2016/2017 Mdm Wong-Mah Jia Lan Confucian Scholarship for his contributions in Confucian moral psychology.
Before embarking on his postgraduate studies, Marcus was a Management Associate in Tan Tock Seng Hospital, and also completed research stints in the Disaster Analytics for Society Lab in NTU and the NTU Institute of Science & Technology for Humanity.
At present, Marcus’ research interest range widely in applied and normative ethics, specifically in reproductive ethics and death ethics. He has published on the subjects of psychiatric medical assistance in dying and antinatalism. He is also a member of the Health ethics, Law and Professionalism (HeLP) team, developing and delivering undergraduate medical ethics lessons
Abstract:
In this article I am interested to paint a novel picture: that parents who birth children with lives worth living are cases of moral good luck. To do this, I paint the standard picture of moral luck, and then extend this to show that childbirth is, in essence, an exercise in moral luck. If my analysis here is correct, then we have reasons to believe that parenthood is a gambit in moral luck. If this proposition is correct, in turn, we have reasons to believe that having children with lives worth living is no more praiseworthy than having children with lives not-worth living. Insofar as we have reasons to believe that birthing children with lives not-worth living is bad, then, I conclude that parents with children with lives worth living perform an equally bad action through their childbearing. I consider an argument from imperfect knowledge, which I take to be the primary argument against my account here, and offer a Sidgwickian response.